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Abstract
This paper provides a brief description of the main systemic problems (strukturprobleme) of
post-communist capitalism(s), as well as exploring the main changes occurring in the social
structure and the subsequent new social risks and welfare state responses emerging. It shows
that post-communist societies are characterized by more intense strukturprobleme, which are
resulting in the materialization of broader social risks types and groups. As a consequence of a
difficult  and still  uncompleted process of  recalibration (functional,  distributive,  normative
and  institutional),  the  welfare  states  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  in  the  Russian
Federation are called to face a double burden of responsibilities: they must ensure protection
against old and new social risks for a larger proportion of citizens than those in the West,
while, simultaneously, dealing with the most serious social, economic and political challenges
stemming from the transition.
1
Introduction
This paper investigates economic and societal changes in Central and Eastern Europe1 (CEE)
and in the Russian Federation. It also attempts to provide a sufficient overview of the main
welfare  state  developments occurring  in  these  transition  economies.  The  investigation  is
structured around four crucial questions. Section One aims to respond to the question of what
kind  of  systemic  problems  (from  now  onwards  strukturprobleme2)  characterize  post-
communist capitalism(s). Section Two addresses the issue of what kind of social structure is
developing, while Section Three deals with the question of what kind of new social risks are
emerging. Finally, Section Four aims to explore what kind of welfare state responses are being
implemented. 
The reason why finding an adequate response to these questions is crucial depends on three
principal  factors.  Firstly,  systemic  deficiencies  present  in  the  economic  environment  can
greatly influence the social structure of a country. Secondly, these deficiencies contribute, at
the same time, to the emergence of specific new social risks. Thirdly, they also determine the
subsequent welfare state responses. As it is well known, the transition from communism to
capitalism has implied huge social costs in both CEE and in the Russian Federation. GDP
dropped severely, many state-owned enterprises collapsed, several million workers lost their
jobs, the paternalistic system of social protection was, to a large extent, dismantled, and, as a
result, poverty rates and income inequality dramatically increased with a large proportion of
the population now living below the poverty threshold (Cerami 2006a, 2006b). 
An enormous transformation, however, occurred not only in the economic sphere, but also in
the relationship between the state, the market and the society. In the immediate aftermath of
1989,  new  ideas,  interests  and  institutions  had  to  be  quickly  introduced3.  A  new  social
contract, no longer based on one-party rule and full-employment, had to be established with
the  citizens,  whereas,  in  order  to  put  the  new  social  contract  in  action,  new  feasible
institutions  and  interests  had  to  be  developed.  This  implied  a  process  of  functional,
1 The countries of Central and Eastern Europe included in this paper are Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2 In the  course of  this  research the German word  Strukturprobleme,  as introduced by Claus Offe
(1973,  2006),  instead  of  the  English  translation  “structural  problems”  will  be  used.  “Structural
problems” tend, in fact, to have a different meaning from the original German translation, which more
clearly makes reference to “problems of the structure” (or systemic problems).
3 For the role played by ideas, interests and institutions in the process of institutional change, see Hall
(1997).
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distributive, normative  and  institutional recalibration4 in which the functional prerogatives,
distributive objectives, normative foundations and institutional structures of these communist
systems had to be adjusted to the post-communist environment.  As highlighted by several
authors, communist ruins represented, in this context, the main institutional material in which
the new societies could be built (Offe 1996; Crawford and Lijphardt 1997; Stark and Bruszt
1998;  Ekiert  2003).  In other  words,  a  recombinant  transformation of  ideas,  interests  and
institutions took place (Cerami forthcoming).
This study is based on the assumption that the strutkturprobleme of contemporary capitalism
(s), changes in social structure and emergence of new social risks are not unrelated issues, but
elements  strictly  linked  together.  The  main  hypothesis,  which  will  then  be  tested  in  the
following sections, is that due to more drastic systemic structural changes occurring in post-
communist societies, more intense and more diversified strukturprobleme are taking place in
transition economies than those present in the West. These are resulting in faster changes in
social structure as well as the emergence of broader new social risks types and groups. If this
is  the  case,  then  post-communist  welfare  states  are  in  front  of  a  double  burden  of
responsibilities. On the one hand, they will be called to ensure citizens both against old and
new social risks, as Western welfare states are also required to do, while, on the other hand,
they will  also  be  forced  to  intensify their  efforts  in  order  to  deal  with  the  more  severe
problems stemming from the transition. 
1. What Kind of Strukturprobleme Characterize Post-Communist Capitalism(s)? 
This section aims to improve understanding of the main strukturprobleme of post-communist
capitalism(s).  On  the  basis  of  Claus  Offe’s  reflections  (Offe  1973,  2006),  the
strukturprobleme of modern capitalism(s) may involve three distinct dimensions: political,
economic,  and  societal5.  In  the  political  dimension,  the  main  strukturprobleme of
4 The  concepts  of  functional, distributive,  normative  and  institutional  recalibration have  been
introduced by Ferrera et al. (2000) and Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) to describe the changes that
contemporary  welfare  systems  are  facing.  According  to  the  authors,  not  only  an  institutional
recalibration is taking place in western welfare states, but also a  recalibration of the main welfare
functions, distributive aspects and basic norms. Recalibration, as a result, is described as an on-going
process of domestic lesson-drawing associated to cross-national social learning (see also Hemerijck
2006).
5 Arguably,  the  systemic  problems  of  contemporary  capitalism(s)  can  also  have  a  “cultural”
dimension, which concerns the specific “Wirtschaftskultur” (economic culture) or “Wirtschaftsstil”
(economic style) of a country, as highlighted by the German economist Sombart (for an up-to-date
discussion, see Backhaus 2003). Due to the impossibility to conduct a thorough investigation at the
micro-level of the citizens’ and firms’ economic preferences and behaviour, only the key elements of
the abovementioned three distinct dimensions will be highlighted in the course of this paper.
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contemporary capitalism(s) concern the system-stabilizing capacity of political institutions, in
the economic dimension, they concern the economic capacity and performance of firms and
markets,  while,  in  the societal  dimension,  they concern the  social  integration  capacity  of
political, economic and societal institutions. For the sake of brevity, only the key elements for
each distinct dimension will be highlighted. What is important here to note is that even though
no country is immune to systemic problems, in the specific case of transition economies, due
to  the  still  uncompleted  process  of  consolidation  of  democratic  institutions,  these
strukturprobleme are likely to have more serious destabilizing consequences. In this context, a
crucial  question  concerns  not  simply  the  link  that  exists  between  short-term  economic
achievements  of  a  nation  and stability of  its  democratic  institutions,  as  the supporters  of
modernization theory would emphasize (see Lipset 1959; Zapf 1960, 1994, 2002), but also the
long-term political legitimacy of the system, as well as the preservation of mass loyalty to the
newly-established institutions. This will depend, on the one hand, on the political capacity to
manage societal conflicts, while, on the other, to find a response to the new social risks.
1.1 Political Dimension 
In  the  political  dimension,  the  main  strukturprobleme of  post-communist  capitalism(s)
concern the  system-stabilizing capacity of political institutions. This primarily involves the
organization and conflict capacity of political institutions to: (i) address internal challenges;
(ii) stabilize unstable economies; (iii) manage societal conflicts while finding a response to
the emerging new social risks; (iv) ensure mass loyalty and political legitimacy to the system;
(v) permit effective interest representation (trade unions’ and civic society’s organization and
conflict  capacity);  and  (vi)  deal  with  the  exogenous  forces  of  European  Integration  and
globalization. 
Addressing internal challenges in an effective way has probably been the most difficult task
that post-communist governments have been called to face. Disintegrative processes initiated
with the fall of the Berlin Wall have clearly not disappeared overnight, but have produced
long-lasting consequences to the stability of the political systems recently introduced. In fact,
even though recent studies (Vanhuyusse 2006) have shown how violent protests have almost
been absent in CEE (but not in Russia) during the entire period of transition, the presence and,
depending on the periods of crisis, the increasing support for extreme-right or ultra-nationalist
political formations (see Shenfield 2001; Mudde 2005) clearly represents a serious threat to
these modern democracies. The 2005 and 2006 annual reports of the  European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2005, 2006) highlighted, for instance, not only a
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worrying lack of systematic data collection concerned with racist crimes in the region, but
also,  in  some  cases,  that  even  a  general  upward  trend  was  taking  place.  In  the  Russian
Federation, although no accurate information is available, the newspapers continuously report
aggressions against minorities or vulnerable groups. In 2005, these corresponded to at least 28
people killed and 366 assaulted (BBC News 2006). 
Stabilizing unstable economies would, probably, be the best way to avoid undemocratic drifts.
According to the well-known argument of Lipset (1959: 56) “the more well-to-do a nation, the
greater the chances it will sustain democracy”. Other more recent versions of modernization
theory have  called  attention  to  the  redistributive  impact  of  the  nations’  economic
achievements  (see  Zapf  1960,  1994,  2002;  Vanhanen  1997;  Przeworski  et  al.  2000;
Przeworski  2005).  For  Przeworski  (2005),  the probability that  a  democracy survives rises
steeply not in terms of GDP growth, as previously emphasized, but rather in terms of per
capita income. Despite the possible criticisms concerned with modernization theory6, in CEE
and  in  the  Russian  Federation  economic  instability  has  been  associated  with  political
instability, with left- and right-wing coalitions that have rarely survived the duration of one
legislature (Cerami 2006a) and, even when it happened, such as in the case of Putin’s Russia,
questions about the democratic quality of the system can still  be raised (Shevtsova 2003;
Politkovskaya 2004; Eicher and Beichelt 2006). 
Managing societal conflicts while finding a response to new emerging social risks becomes,
in fact, a much more difficult political exercise when governments are facing a moment of
severe  economic  instability.  Which  were,  in  this  context,  the  main  political  and  policy
strategies put in place by governments in order to deal with the new challenges? In a path-
breaking but also highly contestable work, Vanhuyusse (2006) argues, for instance, that some
governments in these regions (notably in Hungary and Poland) pursued a  divide and pacify
strategy. According to the author, the hidden aim of politicians and policy-makers was that of
dividing workers by sending them out of the labour market while simultaneously pacifying
them by granting access to early-retirement policies and generous unemployment benefits.
Unquestionably, while a “pacify strategy” certainly took place in Eastern Europe (but not in
Russia where the workers’ requests have systematically remained unheard), then it has still to
6 Opponents of  modernization theory have criticized its simplicity in explaining extremely complex
and problematic processes of social and institutional change. Modernity has, in fact, too often become
synonymous of the West, while the existence of other, different forms of modernity has systematically
been  neglected  or  underestimated  (Ettrich  2005).  In  addition,  while  emphasizing  processes  of
differentiation and rationalization,  modernization theory has not paid  serious attention to the self-
destructive mechanisms that may exist in capitalist societies (Offe 1986).
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be clarified whether the part concerning the “divide strategy” was an intended, or rather an
unintended, outcome of policies that simply aimed at preventing the return to an authoritarian
system. 
Ensuring mass loyalty and political legitimacy to the system cannot be simplified as a matter
of paying social benefits to the most vulnerable groups present at a determined moment in
time, but must be understood in terms of a long-term strategy that  takes into account  the
systemic  problems  of  a  capitalist  society.  These  strukturprobleme go  beyond  temporary
situations  of  economic  vulnerability and cannot  be  explained only in  terms  of  economic
performance.  Can  long term  mass  loyalty  and  political  legitimacy be  ensured  by simply
dividing  and  pacifying  people,  while  reimbursing  them  with  a  low  quality  of  life  and
extremely  limited  living  standards?  Clearly  not  and  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  the
construction of political consensus is a highly unstable process which has material, but also
normative  foundations.  It  is  based  not  only  on  minimum  income  protection,  or  on  the
perception that an authoritarian alternative would be more damaging to the individual’s own
interests (Przeworski 2005), but also on the moral aspirations of citizens. Individuals could
decide to renounce some of their interests and benefits in the light of higher moral values,
such as the refusal of racist attitudes, solidarity towards more vulnerable groups or other less
rational choice oriented elements (see Inglehart 1997).
Permitting effective interest representation could, for example, be another element that would
make democracies more attractive to autocracies. Ensuring effective interest representation in
transition economies has, however, been an uncompleted and mutilated process. Even though,
tripartite consultations have played a crucial role during the entire process of transition by
facilitating the  introduction and continuation of  reforms,  mediating different  interests  and
needs (Ladó 2003), actors in Eastern Europe, however, have lacked the capacity of being true
corporatist  actors in both policy formation and implementation.  Priority was,  in fact,  very
often given to macro-economic stabilization measures. In this context,  state-led corporatism
(Schmidt 2006) or, to use Ebbinghaus’ typology, a consultation model of social governance
(Ebbinghaus 2006)  has  been the main characteristic  of  the Central  and Eastern European
model  of  post-communist  interest  representation  (Cerami  forthcoming).  In  the  Russian
Federation, by contrast, due to the presidential (or super-presidential) character of the political
system (see Eicher and Beichelt 2006),  unilateral state intervention (see Ebbinghaus 2006)
seems to have been the main model of social governance. As it happened during communism,
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tripartite  consultations  were,  in  fact,  highly subjected  to  the  reasons  of  the  state  (or  the
President). 
Effectively dealing with the exogenous forces of European Integration and globalization can
also  be  mentioned  as  an  important  factor  for  the  system-stabilizing  capacity  of  political
institutions.  CEE countries  largely benefited  from  the  direct  and  indirect  support  of  EU
institutions, which helped them to find an immediate place in the EU 15 (now EU 27) as well
as benefitting them through an increase in trade,  which had, in turn,  an indirect  effect  in
diminishing the economic vulnerabilities of these small economies in the global arena. In the
case of  the Russian  Federation,  however,  the impact  of  EU institutions  was clearly more
limited due to the obvious different geo-political context. Restructuring the Russian economy
was also a  much  more  difficult  task due  to  the size  of the country, which multiplied its
economic vulnerabilities making policy responses less effective. It comes, then, as no surprise
that the democratization process was and still  is more difficult to complete in the Russian
Federation than in Eastern Europe.
1.2 Economic Dimension
In  the  economic  dimension,  the  main  strukturprobleme primarily  concern  the  economic
capacity and performance of firms and markets in dealing with endogenous and exogenous
pressures.  These  involve:  (i)  the  macro-economic  vulnerabilities  of  markets;  (ii)  the
companies  organization  and  conflict  capacity  to  deal  with  the  challenges  coming  from
national  and  international  markets;  (iii)  the  development  of  new  institutional
complementarities able  to  produce  comparative  institutional  advantages  in  the  post-
communist  environment;  (iv)  the  reduction  of  regional  and  local  disparities  (existence  of
regional  and  local  capitalisms);  and  (v)  corruption  and  clientelism  as  self-destructive
mechanisms. 
Undeniably, the now open economies of Eastern Europe and Russia are characterized by more
intense macro-economic vulnerabilities than those usually identified in Western countries (see
Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). The collapse of the central planned economy has coincided, in
fact, not only with the collapse of the industrial organization,  in force for more than forty
years, but has exposed these emerging markets to a more severe global competition to which
they were, for structural reasons, not ready for. Industrial production and employment rates
dramatically decreased, while inflation and poverty rates systematically increased in CEE and
with  a  even  higher  intensity  in  the  Russian  Federation.  Even  though  a  stable  economic
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recovery seems to be observable or predicted in the near future (more clearly for Eastern
Europe than for the Russian Federation), questions about the long-term economic and social
performance of these countries must still be raised (Hanson 2003; Simai 2006). Economic and
industrial  restructuring is,  in fact,  an extremely complex and long process of  institutional
recalibration, which depends not only on the successful actions of policy-makers to deal with
internal  structural  problems,  but  also  on  the  actions  and eventual  speculations  of  foreign
investors,  whose  contributions,  more  often  than  not,  have  worsen  the  country’s  own
vulnerabilities. In Eastern Europe and in the Russian Federation, foreign speculators have,
voluntarily or not, contributed to the increase of inflation rates by buying and selling huge
amount  of  currencies  in  periods  of  crisis,  as  well  as,  as  in  the  case  of  big  international
supermarket chains, altering the equilibrium of the prices of products. 
The  firm’s  organization  and  conflict  capacity  to  deal  with  the  challenges  coming  from
national  and  international  markets  was  clearly  more  limited  in  CEE  and  in  the  Russian
Federation than in Western Europe. Companies in post-communist  countries were, in fact,
robustly attacked and put under pressure by more competitive Western firms and products,
which found it easy to alter the false stability established by the communist planners. Only a
few “communist” brands survived the shock of transition,  and among the most successful
almost none survived takeovers from Western firms. Just to quote a few examples, the East
German beer Radeburger, the Vita Cola, the fp6 cigarettes and the Czechoslovak car producer
SKODA are now in the hands of foreign investors. The Trabant, once the most well known
family car of communist citizens, has now completely disappeared from the production and
has now become an object for collectors and nostalgica of the communist era.  The negative
results of the balance of payments speaks clearly in this context.  With the exception of the
Czech Republic and the Russian Federation7, all Eastern European countries showed in 2005
still negative signs (see Table 1). 
7 Please note that the positive results of the Russian balance of payments can be attributed to the
massive devaluation of the currency which took place in 1998. The exchange rate changed from 6 to
approximately 25 roubles to the US dollar.
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Table 1 Resource Balance 
(Exports of Goods and Services Mio. USD)
2005
Bulgaria -4589
Czech Rep. 2546
Estonia -422
Hungary -1325
Latvia -1280
Lithuania -1705
Poland -764
Romania -7927
Russian Federation 103571
Slovakia -2129
Slovenia -212
Source: World Bank 2007 Country At a Glance
A way to reduce these shortcomings could be linked to the development of new institutional
complementarities8 able  to  produce  comparative  institutional  advantages  (see  Hall  and
Soskice 2001) in the post-communist  environment. Unfortunately, with the collapse of the
central planned economy the set of existing  institutional complementarities in force during
communism  also  collapsed.  The  communist  economic  system was  highly  integrated  and
strong  ties  existed  among  all  economic  sectors.  Financial,  industrial  and  labour  market
institutions were not separate entities, but were fully part of the central planned economy. It
comes  then  as  no  surprise  that  once  the  command  economy  collapsed,  post-communist
countries found themselves unprepared in the new open environment. The process of capitalist
conversion meant, in fact, a drastic recalibration of the once established institutional structures
and associated ties. Rigid financial  markets had suddenly to be replaced by more flexible
financial markets. Flexible labour markets had also to be introduced practically by dictation.
As  a  result  of  this  difficult  process  of  adaptation,  the  mobilization  of  resources  and  the
creation of new businesses, which in return would have sustained the demand, were, even
though rapid, not effective at all.
The reduction of regional and local disparities has also become a priority for the economic
capacity  and  performance of  firms  and  markets.  The  Central  and  Eastern  European  and
Russian economies are, in fact, still characterized by the existence of very distinct levels of
regional and local socio-economic development. The presence of different regional and local
8 In the  Variety of Capitalism (VoC) account (see Hall and Soskice 2001), “two institutions can be
said to be complementary when the presence of one increases the efficiency of the other” (Amable
2003,  p.6),  thus,  resulting in a  comparative institutional  advantage.  For example,  “flexible  labour
markets may be more efficient when financial markets allow for a rapid mobilization of resources and
creation of new businesses that in return sustain labour demand” (ibid.). The key question here is to
what extent do changes in one sphere of political economy influence or stimulate change in another
sphere (Hall 2006, p. 191)?
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capitalisms (see Crouch et al. 2004) seems to apply for the Eastern part of Europe, probably,
much more than for the West.  Several studies have, in fact, emphasized the presence and the
reproduction over time of these disparities (European Commission 2005a; World Bank 2005).
In all Eastern European countries and in the Russian Federation, urban areas are not only still
much more developed than rural areas, but also have a faster the degree of development in
comparison to the catch-up processes of rural areas (EFILWC 2006a).
The  emergence  of  corruption  and clientelism as  self-destructive  mechanisms can  also  be
mentioned as a  further  example  of  the  strukturprobleme that  characterize post-communist
capitalism(s). Although the emergence of specific forms of clientelism is not an invention of
the  West,  but  rather  a  heritage  of  the  communist  past,  where  in  order  to  deal  with  the
shortages caused by central planning, “second” and “informal” economies emerged almost
everywhere  in  the  region  (see,  for  instance,  Szélenyi  1988;  Hankiss  1991;  Szalai  2005),
clientelist  relations,  that  once served to  ensure legitimacy for a  system unable to  provide
material support for all citizens and for these functional reasons tolerated by the communist
nomenklatura,  now  contribute  to  its  own  disintegration.  The  Transparency  International
Corruption Perceptions Index9 for the year 2006 ranks these countries from the 24th place in
the case of Estonia to the 84th in the case of Romania and up to the 121st in the case of the
Russian Federation (Table 2). 
Table 2 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
Country Rank Country 2006 CPI Score
24 Estonia 6,7
28 Slovenia 6,4
41 Hungary 5,2
46 Czech Republic 4,8
46 Lithuania 4,8
49 Latvia 4,7
49 Slovakia 4,7
57 Bulgaria 4
61 Poland 3,7
84 Romania 3,1
121 Russia 2,5
Corruption Perception Index scores relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by
business  people  and  country  analysts,  and  ranges  between  10  (highly  clean)  and  0  (highly
corrupt) (Source: Transparency International web-site. URL: http://www.transparency.org/).
9 Corruption Perceptions Index scores relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by
business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
(Source: Transparency International web-site. URL: http://www.transparency.org/).
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1.3 Societal Dimension
In the societal dimension, the main strukturprobleme of post-communist capitalism(s) concern
the social integration capacity of political and economic institutions. From a societal point of
view, the transition from a planned to a market economy could be described in terms of a
“social implosion”. The major societal changes here have involved three main areas: (i) the
social inclusion, (ii) the life chances and (iii) the quality of life of citizens. 
In  terms  of  social  inclusion,  post-communist  countries  have  witnessed  a  rise  in  poverty,
income inequality, social fragmentation, as well as in material, cultural and social deprivation.
According to the most recent World Bank estimations (poverty threshold of 2 US dollars a
day), even though 40 million people have moved out of poverty as a whole, in the Central and
Eastern European and CIS region, more than 60 million still remain poor, while more than
150 million are addressed as being economically vulnerable (World Bank 2005, p. 2). Social
exclusion has also drastically increased. The poor are not only more often excluded by the
labour market, but also face more difficulties in establishing a decent social life. Material,
cultural and social deprivation, certainly not absent even before the fall of the Berlin Wall,
have now drastically increased (Simai 2006). Recent studies on intergenerational transmission
of  poverty conducted  in  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Poland  and the  Russian  Federation
(Manning and Tikhonova 2004; Profit 2005a, 2005b) show, for instance, how poverty has
now a much more self-perpetuating character than it had during communism, where belonging
to, or not,  the nomenklatura was the main means of transmission of inequalities. 
In  terms  of  life  chances,  the  increase  in  mortality,  drugs  and  alcohol  abuse,  infectious
diseases,  and  suicides  is  one  of  the  main  concerns  following  the  dissolution  of  the  Iron
Curtain.  Statistics  provided by the  World  Health  Organization show that  mortality rates,
which have now diminished in CEE from an average of 1120 per 100 000 inhabitants in 1989
to 971 in 2005, are steadily increasing in the Russian Federation from 1160 in 1989 to 1510 in
2005. Alcohol abuse has also grown as a result of transition. In CEE countries, for example,
the pure alcohol consumption (litres per capita) has increased from 8.7 in 1989 to 9.3 in 2005,
while in the Russian Federation it has almost doubled (from 5.3 to 8.9). HIV/AIDS has also
become a major problem. In Eastern Europe, the number of new HIV infections has increased
of twenty times,  from an average of 9 in 1989 (without Poland10)  to  176 in 2005. In the
Russian Federation, the number of new HIV infections in 2005 was 131 times higher than in
10 In Poland the number of new HIV infections was already higher in 1989 than the normal Eastern
average. It increased from 517 in 1989 to 652 in 2005.
11
1989  (from  272  in  1989  to  35739  in  2005)  surpassing  many third  world  countries.  As
correctly emphasized by Zinoviev (quoted in Field and Twigg, 2000, p.5), this can now be
described as a form of “self-induced genocide”. Last but not least, after the shock of the first
years of transition where the number of suicides increased in all countries, the number of
suicides and self-inflicted injuries per 100 000 inhabitants in CEE decreased from 23 in 1989
to 19 in 2005, while in the Russian Federation, no sign of improvement (it has increased, in
fact, from 27 in 1989 to 30 in 2005) is observable (WHO Health for All Database 2007). 
In terms of quality of life, the major political and economic changes have implied an increase
in social closure, the deterioration of family relations and traditional family ties, as well as a
reduction  of  social  networking capacity,  especially for  the  poorest  social  strata,  with  the
consequent diminution of possibilities for finding a job. Reports conducted by the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EFILWC) have, in fact,
not only constantly emphasized the link existent between poverty and social segregation (in
some  cases  emphasizing  also  the  “self-segregation”  character  of  poverty),  but  have  also
highlighted the presence of a North-South as well as of a East-West divide (EFILWC 2004a,
2006b;  Manning and Tikhonova 2004). As a consequence of these increasing economic and
social gaps, not three (Esping-Andersen 1990) or four (Ferrera 1998), but rather five different
“social Europe” seem to characterize the Old Continent in the most  disparate areas of the
individual’s social life. These areas include, for example, income inequality and deprivation
(EFILWC 2005a), life satisfaction and happiness (EFILWC 2005b), family, work and social
networks (EFILWC 2004b, 2005c), reconciliation of work and private life (EFILWC 2006c),
participation in civil  society (EFILWC 2006d) as well as the social  dimension of housing
(European Commission 2005b; EFILWC 2006e).
2. What Kind of Social Structure is Developing in CEE and Russia?
In the previous section, some of the main strukturprobleme of post-communist capitalism(s)
have been highlighted. The following section aims to clarify what kind of social structure is
developing in CEE and in the Russian Federation. Dramatic changes clearly occurred in the
labour structure, family and household composition, but how dramatic were these changes?
The most important impact can, probably, be identified in the emergence of completely new
forms of vertical disparities, the positions of individuals in the social class, as well as in new
forms of horizontal disparities, increasing poverty and income inequality for households.
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2.1 Labour Structure
As far as the changes in the labour structure are concerned, these have primarily involved: (i)
an increase in the number of unemployed due to the dismissal of workers in numerous state-
owned  enterprises;  (ii)  an  increase  in  employment  in  the  private  sector  (and  in  self-
employment) due to the privatization of the central planned economy; (iii) a drastic decrease
of people working in the agricultural and industrial sector only in part covered by an increase
in the number of those employed in the service sector; (iv) the formation of a new managerial
elite (class), formed, however, in a large part by previous administrators and technocrats (see
Szélenyi 1988; Eyal et al. 1998); (v) the emergence of a new middle class, including self-
employed people who work in their own enterprises, white-collar workers and intellectuals
(Adamski et. al. 2001; Machonin et al. 2001; Spéder et al. 2001; Tuček  2001; György and
Róbert 2003); and (vi) the dissolution of the once crucial social  class of the “skilled manual
workers” (Slomczynski and Mach 1997). 
As  a more in-depth  comparison of  patterns  of  employment  according to  the occupational
sector shows, most recently (from 1997 to 2005), that major changes have, first and foremost,
involved: 1) the  skilled agricultural and fishery workers whose number has doubled in the
Russian Federation (+100%), but decreased by one-third in CEE (-36%); 2)  professionals,
whose number has increased by one-third in CEE (+29%) and by one-fifth in the Russian
Federation (+22%); and 3) service workers and shop and market sales workers whose number
has increased by more than one-third (+48%) in the Russian Federation, and with a lower
intensity,  by  approximately  one-tenth  (+12%)  in  CEE.  Interestingly,  in  the  Russian
Federation,  the number of citizens  employed as  legislators, senior officials  and managers
have  increased  by  approximately  one-forth  (+26%)  in  recent  years,  while  workers  in
elementary occupations have decreased by approximately one-sixth (-15%) (see Fig. 1). Used
with due caution, these results lead to the conclusion that patterns of change in the labour
structure have not proceeded with the same speed and intensity in Eastern Europe than in the
Russian Federation, even though these two regions share the same communist legacies. CEE
countries  are,  in  fact,  moving faster  towards  a  labour  structure  similar  to  those  in  more
consolidated Western societies (e.g. drastic reduction of farmers), while, in the case of the
Russian  Federation,  the  communist  transition  seems still  to  be  underway, as  the  growing
number of people occupied in the agricultural sector indicates. 
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Fig. 1 Employment by Occupation (Change 1997-2005)
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2.2 Employment Relations
Changes in the labour structure have also resulted in changes in employment relations and, in
particular,  in:  (a)  the  dismissal  of  life-long  employment  status;  (b)  the  alteration  of  the
relationship between work performance vs. work remuneration; and (c) the establishment of
new wage gaps. Fig. 2 shows how the employment ratio (the number of employed as per cent
of  population  aged  15-59)  in  CEE  and  in  the  Russian  Federation  has  dropped  from
approximately  80%  in  1989  to  less  than  70%  in  2004.  Despite  increasing  income
differentiation, real  wages (the income of an individual after taking into consideration the
effects of inflation on purchasing power) have also declined. In 2004, only in CEE were real
wages  close  to  the  value  they  had  in  1989,  while  in  the  Russian  Federation  they  still
corresponded to 75% of the value in 1989 (Fig. 3). The “new” phenomenon of the working
poor citizens has also dramatically come to the attention of the international community. A
forthcoming report of the World Bank emphasizes, for instance,  how this category of citizens
remains  the  largest  constituents  of  the  poor  in  both  CEE  and  Russia  (World  Bank
forthcoming).  Despite  this  group of  workers  being difficult  to  identify and to  quantify, a
seminar report prepared for the European Commission suggests that the number in the Eastern
region should be substantially higher than the 17% of self-employed people and 6% of those
employed present in Western Europe (EFILWC 2004c). Wage gaps (occupational wage gap,
generational wage gap, educational wage gap) have also drastically increased. If, on the one
hand, this had some positive connotations, since it provided a first response to the excessive
income homogeneity in force during communism, where unskilled workers and professionals
earned almost the same amount of money (this also resulted in lower economic performance
in absence of work incentives), excessive wage differences now exist between the nouveaux
riches (those few people who massively benefited from the privatization of the economy) and
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the rest of the population who continue to suffer for the rise in living expenses. In addition to
wage gaps existent between different people employed in different occupational sectors as
well  as  between  people  of  different  ages  and  educational  levels,  there  are  also  wage
differences between men and women (the so-often quoted “gender  wage gap”) that,  once
almost nonexistent in the region, have now dramatically increased, with women now facing
new forms of gender segregation (Manning and Tikhonova 2004; Pascall and Kwak 2005). 
Fig. 2 Employment Ratio
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Fig. 3 Real Wages (base year = 100)
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2.3 Family and Household Composition
With  regards  to  the  major  changes  that  are  occurring  in  the  family  and  household
composition, these primarily involve an increasing poverty for: (i) single-headed households;
(ii) single parents; (iii) single women with children; (iv) households with unemployed, part-
time or atypical workers; (v) households with elderly; (vi) households with young people; and
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(vii)  households  of  the  Roma minority.  For  these  groups  of  people  extreme  poverty still
represents a major and unresolved problem both in CEE and in the Russian Federation (for a
brief overview, see World Bank 2005; Cerami 2006a, 2006b). Extreme poverty, however, is
not the only negative outcome, social segregation is also on the increase, with a higher number
of family members from these categories now formally excluded by those normal activities
that were once available to the society at large (such as access to cultural events) (Manning
and Tikhonova 2004; Szalai 2005). Even though these systemic changes are not very different
from the ones that are taking place in other post-industrial societies, one should bear in mind
that the negative repercussions tend to be multiplied by the more unstable nature of these
democracies in  transition.  As noted by Domański (2005) and Keller  (2005),  while during
communism withdrawal from public life and abstention from active political participation was
functional  to  the  survival  of  the  communist  system,  in  the  post-communist  environment,
increasing political apathy represents a serious threat to the stability of democratic institutions
since participation in public  life and political  participation are  the foundations of modern
democracies.
3. What Kind of New Social Risks are Emerging?11
As a consequence of the strukturprobleme, and changes to the social and political structures, it
is  important  to  identify  the  new  social  risks  faced  by  CEE  countries  and  the  Russian
Federation. The literature on new social risks primarily concerned with Western European
countries  (Esping-Andersen  1999;  Esping-Andersen  et  al.  2002;  Taylor-Gooby  2004;
Armingeon and Bonoli  2006) identifies as the principal  factors for the emergence of new
social risks, the de-industrialization and tertiarization of employment, women’s entry in the
labour market, increasing instability of the family structure, as well as processes linked to the
privatization of the welfare state. Can such factors, developed for the West, be applied in toto
to Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation as well? Here, one important remark has to be
made. Whereas during communism, the main risks that Eastern citizens faced were primarily
related  to  the  possibility of  not  finding  the  necessary consumables  in  the  shops  due  the
“economy of  shortage”  (Kornai  1992)  or  dealing  with  poor  or  the  bad  quality  of  social
services,  in  the  post-communist  environment  the  spectrum  of  “new”  social  risks  is
substantially broader. New social risks include, for example, balancing paid work with family
responsibilities, care for elderly parents and lacking skills (or having obsolete skills) in the
11 This section has greatly benefited from discussions during a seminar on “Individual Risks in Post-
Industrial  Societies”  jointly  developed  with  Frank  Ettrich  at  the  Zentrum  für  Deutschland  und
Europastudien (ZDES) of the State University of Saint Petersburg, Russia (8-28th April 2007).
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labour market, as identified for the West, but also having no longer access to a secure job,
pension, health care, or minimum income. 
3.1 New Social Risks Types: West vs. East
According  to  Esping-Andersen’s  classification  (1999,  pp.  40-43), three  different  types  of
social  risks  can  be  identified  in  Western  Europe:  class-based  risks,  life-course  risks and
intergenerational  risks.  While  class-based  risks are  primarily concerned  with  the  uneven
distribution  of  risks  in  the  social  class,  life-course  risks tend  to  involve  their  uneven
distribution during the entire life of the individual.  Intergenerational risks, by contrast, are
those more directly concerned with intergenerational transmission and inheritance of chances
and associated hazards. An example of class-based risks is the possibility of unemployment
for those in a poorer social strata due to obsolete training and/or skills, where as life-course
risks include  increasing  poverty  for  elderly  or  for  younger  generations.  Finally,
intergenerational risks include the possibility that the sons of the unemployed will face higher
chances of becoming unemployed themselves. An alternative, but not very dissimilar model
proposed  by  Kitschelt  and  Philipp  (2006)  divides  new  social  risks  in  terms  of  general
existential risks  (those concerning the inability to work due to illness and old age),  group-
specific risks I  (those concerning the obsolence of skills due to structural changes),  group
specific risks II (those concerning the uncertain returns on higher education, e.g. of specific
academic fields) and group  specific risks III: demographic risks (those concerning the loss of
earnings due to demographic reproduction, e.g. raising children). 
Regardless the type of classification one decides to adopt, an important question that still has
to be clarified regards the fact  of whether these new social risks types in the West really
correspond to the new social risks types present in the East. Although de-industrialization and
tertiarization of employment is occurring both in the West as well as in the East, the social
changes  associated  with  the  restructuring  of  the  central  planned  economy,  and  the  fast
emergence of a new social structure no longer based on central planning, are a phenomenon
only present in Eastern European societies and Russia. Moreover, while the entry of women in
the  labour  market  can  be  addressed  as  a  possible  threat  to  already existing  equilibriums
present  in  western  labour  markets,  this  certainly  cannot  be  the  case  for  post-communist
countries,  which  were  already  structurally  characterized  by  higher  levels  of  female
employment. Rather, the new challenge that post-communist societies are called to face in this
area of social protection seems to be concerned not with a  farewell to maternalism, to use
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Orloff’s  metaphor  (Orloff  2006),  but  rather  with  the  establishment  of  new  forms  of
refamilization. 
It can, as a consequence, be concluded that in addition to the new social risks types present in
Western  societies,  Eastern  societies  are  also  characterized  by  peculiar  “past-dependent”
property-related social risks, which find their origin in the restructuring of the central planned
economy and in  the  subsequent  changes  occurring in  the  social  structure.  Here,  the  term
“property” should be understood in the broadest possible sense, including not only material
capital (such  as  the ownership  of  property assets),  but  also  cultural  capital (such as  the
impossibility of transforming educational skills developed for the communist system to skills
that can be used in the post-communist environment), as well as  social capital (such as the
capacity to develop or to be part of post-communist social networks). 
3.2 New Social Risks Groups and Political Preferences
On the basis of the considerations mentioned above, for transition countries, new social risks
groups also tend to be larger and more variegated constituencies than those existent in the
West.  They involve, in fact, a broader spectrum of citizens,  which includes the traditional
categories present in the West, such as the unemployed, women, young, elderly, handicapped,
children, minorities, large families with children, single parents, single women, and working
poor (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Kitschelt and Philipp 2006), as well as other categories of
workers such as all those citizens unable to conduct a reconversion of their material, cultural
and  social  capital  (e.g.  middle-age  employees  of  ex  state-owned  enterprises,  low  level
bureaucrats and civil servants, people out of post-communist social networks, etc.).
As it is easy to imagine,  these new social  risks constituencies will  have distinct interests,
needs,  party preferences  and political  affiliations.  The  increasing  number  of  unemployed,
pensioners,  young and women in  part-time or  atypical  jobs  are  likely to  be  an important
predictor for the future emergence and political strength of new welfare preferences in the
region.  It is,  in fact,  to  be expected that  in countries where the economic crisis has been
stronger there will also be a tendency to develop stronger requests for an active management
of  the  state  in  protecting  against  new social  risks.  Due  to  the  higher  number  of  people
involved, these welfare constituencies are also likely to be stronger in Eastern, rather than in
Western Europe. The clearest indicator of this trend lies, probably, with the high instability of
governments,  which  characterizes  transition  countries  since  the  first  free  parliamentary
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elections, and the use of economic and social reforms as primary determinants and reasons for
governmental change (see Cerami 2006a, esp. pp. 16-29). 
4. What Kind of Welfare State Responses are Being Implemented?
The fourth and final section aims to discuss the main welfare state developments in the region
with  a  particular  reference  given  to  new  social  risks  management.  Such  an  analysis  is
important for several reasons. As mentioned in the previous parts,  strukturprobleme of post-
communist capitalism(s), changes in social structure and emergence of new social risks, are
not  unrelated  issues.  Instead,  these  directly  related  issues  all  contribute  to  the  political
legitimacy of a country. Here, beyond the successful adaptation of pre-existing institutional
structures, important questions concerning the effective recalibration of the main functional,
distributive and normative priorities of these systems  must be asked in terms of not only who
gets what and under what circumstances  in the new market economy,  but also in terms of
who protects whom and under what circumstances in the new welfare architecture. 
4.1 Welfare State Developments 
As far as the main welfare state  developments  in CEE and in the Russian Federation are
concerned, these can, very briefly, be summarized in terms of: (1) privatization of provisions;
(2) individualization of risks; and (3) monetarization of access12. These three main processes
have taken the form of the reintroduction (or strengthening) of the social insurance principle
in the overall social security system, privatization and differentiation of benefits in the pension
sector,  dissolution of the Semashko health  care model  coupled with the introduction of a
decentralized public/private mix of health care facilities, the establishment (in the majority of
cases)  of  a  three-pillar  system  of  protection  against  unemployment  consisting  of
unemployment  benefits,  unemployment  assistance  and  social  assistance,  a  redefinition
towards the bottom of the excessive benefits and entitlements provided during communism in
the sector of family policies, and the introduction of a basic safety net for the poorest social
strata  (see  Cerami  2006a,  2006b).  This  has  corresponded,  in  brief,  to  a  shift  from
universalistic to status maintenance aspirations.
In the case of the Russian Federation, the restructuring of the social security system has taken
a  slightly  more  neo-liberal  path  with  a  major  emphasis  given  to  privatizations  and
liberalization of provisions according to more strict IMF’s and World Bank’s prescriptions.
12 For the concept of individualization and monetarization of risks I am particularly grateful to Frank
Ettrich.
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The social insurance principle has been reinforced, privatization of pension and health care
provisions  strengthened,  protection  against  unemployment,  social  assistance  and  family
benefits greatly reduced in scope and coverage in order not to compromise the flexibility of
labour markets. The influence of the European Union, as expressed by the ideals in the so-
called European Social Model, has, in fact, been almost inexistent due to the absence of the
incentives linked to the prospects of Enlargement. The IMF and World Bank have had, in this
context,  much more scope to see their policy preferences implemented, especially through
stricter  conditionality rules for granting access to loans, than usually applied in other CEE
countries. 
What these changes have meant in terms of welfare state performance in reducing poverty and
income inequality has differed in intensity from country to country. As Table 3 shows, the
lowest poverty rates after social transfers can be found in the Czech Republic and Slovenia,
with  approximately 10% of  the  population  below the  poverty line  (calculated  as  60% of
equivalised  median  disposable  income),  while  the  highest  poverty rates  in  CEE  can,  by
contrast, be found in Lithuania and Poland with approximately 21% of the population below
this  poverty  threshold.  As  far  as  the  impact  of  social  transfers  in  reducing  poverty  is
concerned, the welfare states in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia seem to be the
most  effective,  with  poverty  rates  that  have  decreased  after  social  transfers  by  one-half
(respectively  -52%,  -55%  and  -41%).  Meager  results  have  been  achieved  by  Bulgaria,
Lithuania and Romania, with a reduction of poverty after social transfers between only one-
tenth and two-tenths (-12%, -19% and -18%) (see Table 3). 
Table 3 Poverty Rates Before and After Social Transfers (2005)
60% Equivalised Median Income
before after % of change
EU 15 26 16 38
Bulgaria 17 15 12
Czech Republic 21 10 52
Estonia 24 18 25
Latvia 26 19 27
Lithuania 26 21 19
Hungary 29 13 55
Poland 30 21 30
Romania 22 18 18
Slovenia 16 10 38
Slovakia 22 13 41
Russia (2000) 36 26 28
Source: Eurostat 2007;  Cerami 2006b
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Unfortunately, no comparable data is available for the Russian Federation, since the official
poverty line is calculated according to a different method, which is based on the average cost
of food items in a food basket for low-income persons. If a similar method with calculations
on 60% equivalised income (Cerami 2006b) is applied, then it can be seen that the Russian
welfare state in 2000 achieved only meager results since its reduction of poverty after social
transfers was only approximately one-third (-28%). Other more recent data, according to a
modified version of the official poverty line on the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(Mroz et al. 2005), have suggested, however, that, after a peak at 38% of people below the
poverty line in 1998, this number has drastically decreased to 9.5% in 2004. These results are,
needless to say, extremely controversial, because, if correct, they would mean that the poverty
rate in the Russian Federation is now not only at a lower level than all of the richest and more
redistributive  European  countries  (the  EU15  average  for  2004  was  17%,  with  the  best
performing country, Sweden, with a poverty rate of 11%), disappearing basically overnight in
only six years, but also that a consolidated democratic system (see Eicher and Beichelt 2006)
is not a necessary precondition for stabilizing unstable economies. A slightly more different
picture is provided by another official source (the  Federal State Statistics Service),  which
states that the population with money incomes13 below the subsistence minimum level in 2004
corresponded to 25 million people, or 17.6 % of the total population. If the structure of the
money income of the population is taken into account, then in 2004 65% of sources were
derived from labour remuneration, 11.7% from entrepreneurial activities, 8.3% from property
incomes,  2.2% from other  incomes,  and  only 12.8% from social  transfers  (Federal  State
Statistics Service 2007). 
4.2 Welfare State Responses to New Social Risks
How well are governments dealing with new social risks? Which are, in other words, the main
welfare  state  responses  to  new  social  risks  implemented  in  CEE  and  in  the  Russian
Federation? Even though, as it has been mentioned, it is difficult in post-communist countries
to make a clear distinction between old and new social risks due to the problems associated to
the  transition  towards  a  market  economy,  some common  trends  can  be  identified.  In the
pension and health care sector, these correspond to an (involuntary) increasing effort of the
state, not always successful, to ensure coverage for a growing number of vulnerable citizens
(such as the unemployed, atypical workers, etc.). This has, so far, materialized either in the
13 Please  note  that  calculations  based  on  money income  do  not  take  into  account  the  household
production of goods, which has often been addressed as an important, additional source of income for
these transition economies.
21
establishment of a fourth-tier (the so-called zero-pillar) in the three-pillar pension scheme or
by covering the deficit of the health insurance funds. In the sector of employment, the main
policy responses in tackling new social risks have taken the form of a widespread use of active
labour market policies coupled with limited life-long training, and start-up jobs measures. In
the field of family policies, these have corresponded to a reduction in child care and maternity
leaves, associated, however, with the establishment of paternal leaves and the first laws for
long-term care14. Finally, in the field of poverty and social exclusion, governments’ responses
to new social risks have involved the introduction of social safety nets for a larger proportion
of unprotected citizens through the establishment of a guaranteed minimum income coupled,
in most cases, with strict means-testing. Here, what is important to remember is that these
measures have been conducted in a more neo-liberal way in the Russian Federation than in
CEE. In the Russian Federation, the state has, in fact, preferred in many occasions to withdraw
from its  responsibilities  in  social  protection,  as the  demonstrations  of pensioners in  2005
against the cuts in social benefits (e.g. free public transportation, and subsidies for medicine,
rent, utilities and other basic services) proposed by Putin, have shown.
To  summarize  and  in  order  to  provide  some  policy  recommendations,  for  the  reasons
mentioned in previous sections, life-long learning for transition economies has become a vital
means in the process of recalibration and reconversion of the workers’ obsolete skills. Fig. 4
provides  some  information  about  the  percentage  of  the  adult  population  aged  25  to  64
involved in life-long learning (education and training) in CEE. As it can immediately be seen,
despite the necessity for investment in life-long training, CEE countries continue to invest less
than Western European Member States. Only in Slovenia are the numbers involved in these
measures, in fact, higher than the EU 15 average. Interestingly, the poorest countries of the
region (Bulgaria and Romania) are also the ones who have invested less in life-long learning.
This is probably the expression of a vicious circle in which the absence of financial means
necessary for these measures negatively impacts on the chances of citizens to be adequately
covered  by the  new emerging  social  risks.  Despite  no  comparable  data  available  for  the
Russian Federation, the number of graduates from higher education institutions per 10 000
employed in  the economy has  risen from 63 000 in 1993/1994 to  172 000 in 2005/2006
(Federal State Statistics Service 2007). This provides some evidence, on the one hand, of the
huge  importance  that  the  development  of  new  and  suitable  skills  may  have  for  post-
14 Please note that until 1989 long-term care was the entire responsibility of families or, when family
support was not available, patients were “institutionalized”.
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communist societies, while, on the other, it also shows the difficulties of the Russian labour
market to absorb the increasing number of new graduates.
Fig. 4 Life-Long Learning (% of adults) 2005
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Conclusions
This paper has attempted to respond to the four main questions, which were at the core of the
investigation.  It has  been argued that  post-communist  societies  are  characterized  by more
severe  strukturprobleme than those usually identified for Western countries. These concern
the  system-stabilizing  capacity of  political  institutions,  the  economic  capacity  and
performance  of firms and markets,  as  well  as  the  social  integration capacity  of political,
economic and societal institutions.  It has also been argued that these  strukturprobleme are
associated with  faster  changes  in the  social  structure,  which  are,  in  turn,  resulting in the
emergence  of  broader  new social  risks  types  and  constituencies.  Welfare  states  in  these
transition  economies  are,  as  a  consequence  of  a  difficult  and  still  unfinished  process  of
functional,  distributive,  normative and  institutional  recalibration,  charged  with  a  double
burden of responsibilities. They are, on the one hand, called to find an immediate response to
more pressing old and new social risks, while, on the other, they are requested to deal with the
challenges stemming from more drastic economic, political and societal transformations that
has followed their transition towards democracy.
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